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Employer Resistance to the 
Fordist Production Process: 
‘Flawed Fordism’ in Post-War Britain 
IAN CLARK
The flawed nature of Britain’s fordism in the post-war period and its consequent
impact on post-fordism in the British economy appears clear-cut and incontrovertible.
Craft-dominated trade unions controlled the shop floor and prevented management
from introducing fordist methods of work organisation and an associated pattern of
regulation for the labour process. The argument of this article contends that as
descriptors of British industry in its various stages of post-war development, the utility
of terms such as ‘fordism’, ‘flawed fordism’ and ‘post-fordism’ is strictly limited. The
status of these terms as analytical and empirical categories is controversial, yet they
remain significant in the literature on contemporary history and economic decline.
Documentary, empirical and historical material illustrates that the introduction of mass
standardised production on the fordist model was less than successful during the post-
war period yet as this article argues employee resistance appears less significant than
employer resistance and the structural impact of British markets. 
The British case shows that fordism is not always an inevitability which
imposes itself due to its superior economic efficiency. A strong labour
movement, defending precise skills, tasks and job rules can block most of
the productive potential associated with modern management methods. This
can be termed ‘flawed fordism’.1
The decline of shop-floor skills during the fordist era meant that Britain
was not in as good a position to take advantage of modern flexible
production technology as Germany or other European countries’2
The flawed nature of Britain’s fordism in the post-war period and its
consequent impact on post-fordism in the British economy appears clear cut
and incontrovertible. Craft-dominated trade unions controlled the shop floor
and prevented management from introducing fordist methods of work
organisation and associated labour process managed and regulated in the
workplace. The reform and replacement of craft methods of production,
dominant in many sectors of British manufacturing industry, was necessary
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to raise productivity, re-structure the economy and secure post-war
reconstruction. Attempts by employers to increase control and raise
productivity by de-skilling the labour force, together with employee
resistance at the point of production, appear as dominant organising
concepts in the contemporary literature on economic decline. By
association, regulation theorists extend these concepts to explain the
comparatively flawed nature of Britain’s post-war fordism. 
It appears that academic, practitioner and policy debates take as given
certain organising concepts as significant explanations of economic and
institutional conditions in the British economy, which affect economic
performance. This is the case in historical and contemporary contributions
to the debate to the extent that fordism, flawed fordism and post-fordism
appear structurally embedded in the historiography of the post-war period.3
Documentary and empirical material illustrate that both contributions fail to
convincingly demonstrate that fordism and mass production provide a
significant theoretical and empirical basis to assess the production process
in British manufacturing in the immediate post-war period.4 Further,
documentary material demonstrates that employer resistance to industrial
restructuring modelled on a fordist production process is of greater
historical significance than worker resistance at the point of production. 
The article aims to demonstrate this argument through three themes.
First, in the immediate post-war period work organisation appeared as a
fordist control of labour time. Debates on regulation and the labour process
and de-skilling suggest that the dominance of craft production gave way to
Taylorism and then fordism, or identify resistance by craft workers
preventing the effective introduction of fordist work systems.5 However,
these approaches appear to brush over the effects of historically embedded
pre-fordist traditions present in many British firms.6 In the immediate post-
war years this tradition created a self-imposed restriction on the
rationalisation of production in many sectors of British manufacturing.
Second, Britain emerged from the Second World War dependent on a
fragmented domestic market and non-standard export markets in Empire
countries and the sterling area. Hence, in the short term employer resistance
to industrial transformation on the fordist model was more instrumental in
motivation than was successful and determined resistance by workers. The
third theme briefly examines contemporary arguments on the long-term
implications of the failure of employers to introduce fordist production
systems and the alleged role of trade unions in the decline of shop-floor
skills. Broadberry argues that trade unions restricted the capability of
British manufacturers to take advantage of modern flexible production
technologies in the period since 1979, that aimed to up-skill workers.7 This
approach reflects a managerial bias in the literature that examines the
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contemporary weakness of the British economy as a failure to make the
transition from fordism to post-fordism.8 More significantly than this, the
approach implies that the arrival of post-fordism in other economies is the
source of their contemporary economic success; however this argument is
disputed by other contributions to the debate.9
In summary the article integrates theoretical arguments with empirical
material to suggest that beyond, and within, academic debates the fordist
production process and the UK’s flawed fordism often appear as
stereotypes. Equally, both categories appear distorted and historically
flawed. Further, both categories attribute successful worker resistance as the
primary explanation for the UK’s poor economic performance and the
persistence of comparatively obsolete methods of production in much of the
contemporary manufacturing sector. A historiography that, albeit briefly,
entertains the conceptual significance of patterns of causation rather than
one driven by generalised descriptors can demonstrate that for several
reasons British manufacturers were incapable of institutionalising what are
now termed ‘fordist production systems’. 
The Impact of Historically Embedded Pre-fordist Structures and
Traditions on British Employers
Regulation and labour process debates on the structure of work organisation
during the post-war period focus on two extremes: the erosion of craft
production and the ascendancy of fordism or, in stark contrast, the
generalisation that craft labour prevented the introduction of fordist work
systems – amalgamated in the descriptor ‘flawed fordism’. Both extremes
fail to attribute causal weight to the significance of pre-fordist traditions
exhibited by British employers in the immediate post-war period. As an
embedded and familiar structure this tradition created a self-imposed
restriction on the take-up of fordist systems of work organisation and
associated reform of control strategies for labour at the workplace. For
example, advocates of fordism attribute its flawed make-up in the UK to the
failure of British employers to establish direct control over labour on the
shop floor.10 The intransigence of organised labour at the workplace appears
critical to this failure, but historical evidence reveals that employers and
managers had little or no interest in improving or transforming undeveloped
management control systems towards the fordist model.11 The evidence
clearly demonstrates this was the case within the British section of the
Anglo-American Council for Productivity (AACP). Norman Kipping, the
Federation of British Industry (FBI) director general and joint secretary of
the AACP’s British section ruled out any American interference within the
British section and its deliberations on post-war recovery. For Kipping the
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British section was a British-only affair that incorporated the interests of
organised labour. Further, in terms of post-war recovery Kipping rejected a
statistical focus on productivity improvement in favour of lowest cost at a
given scale of output. As a result of this strategy labour productivity did
improve whilst the short-termism of this strategy ensured that in theoretical
terms the law of diminishing returns was quickly encountered. Because
output was the central consideration productivity did improve, but it
sustained a level of allocative inefficiency in the absence of sustained
capital investment and renewal to raise the scale of operations, therefore
pushing back the onset of diminishing returns. As output dominated in this
aim there was little likelihood of renewal of production systems on the
‘fordist’ model. Moreover, as output and productivity improved it appeared
unnecessary as well as impractical.12
The approach of the AACP reflected that developed by the FBI as early
as 1943 where forecasts of the UK’s post-war financial position indicated
that output must prevail over industrial reconstruction. A key aspect of what
became the AACP’s short-termist approach was a fear of British exposure
to American competition in Empire and Middle Eastern markets.13 The
creation of the sterling area restricted American access to British markets
whilst maintaining export demand for pre-war British products. 
A number of analysts argue that Fordist models of work organisation
dominated the immediate post-war decades.14 In contrast to this
generalisation, Gallie et al. demonstrate that the fordist model represents an
abstract analytical framework whereas other contributions assert quite clearly
that employers aimed to introduce such a system for work organisation, that
is, re-structure and scale-up firms on the basis of ‘model fordism’ evident in
the American manufacturing sector.15 By definition, a movement to mass
production entails a rationalisation of the production process and a
formalisation of organisational structures. Rationalisation and formalisation
enable a firm to benefit from economies of scale and scope that further
increase efficiency and ultimately ensure profitability and survival.16 In the
British case influential accounts of the post-war period argue that the diffusion
of fordist work systems was relatively slow and diluted. The violent
opposition of trade unions who resisted the erosion of craft-based production
and promoted restrictive labour practices in the workplace receive particular
attention in explanations of the retarded movement to fordist work systems.17
Boyer, a prominent advocate of the ‘flawed fordism’ thesis, argues that
by the mid-1960s firms in the British manufacturing sector had reached the
technical limits of fordist work systems, comparatively early. To some
extent failure was assured by the refusal of post-war governments to
effectively institutionalise collective bargaining.18 As early as the late 1950s
lay activists dominated workplace industrial relations, successfully
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restricting the standardisation of output. In similar vein to Boyer,
Broadberry and Crafts argue that reform of institutional arrangements for
the management of industrial relations and the labour process requires
government action which successive post-war governments refused to
entertain for electoral reasons.19 Moreover, Broadberry and Crafts argue that
the UK’s industrial relations system grew out of (what became) a
historically embedded attachment to craft production. As a result of this,
movement to mass-production fordist methods for work organisation was,
in the absence of government action, likely to fail because of resistance by
craft workers to any measure that appears to erode income levels. In
summary the shop floor was controlled by organised labour rather than
directly controlled by management. More controversially, the authors assert
that the craft-based origins of the post-war industrial relations system –
apprentice labour, demarcation agreements in multi-unionism and
workplace restrictive practices – were severely detrimental to human capital
formation at the workplace. In turn, poor investment in training and
development restricted technology transfer into the British economy and by
association restricted firms to traditional non-standard – differentiated –
markets at home and abroad.20 What these accounts fail to examine are
managerial motives in the retarded introduction of mass-production systems
for fordist work organisation. 
British employers appeared to measure efficiency and its future security,
not in terms of an internal re-organisation of work systems and an
associated rationalisation of product and labour process, but achievement of
secure markets. British manufacturers served differentiated domestic and
overseas markets; to them, policies for workplace industrial relations
reflected a strategic choice – to maintain these markets, many of which
exhibited cartel and monopoly arrangements.21
Documentary evidence demonstrates that representatives of British
employers in key peak associations such as the FBI, and the British section
of the AACP, systematically promoted the following argument. In order to
secure post-war recovery, continuity with pre-war domestic and overseas
markets in Empire nations and the sterling area was vital. In this context, it
was unlikely that production systems and associated patterns of workplace
industrial relations could be significantly revised. Output was the key
objective, rather than standardisation of output, the production process or
significant capital investment in new production systems.22 Further, many
family based dis-integrated firms relied on the presence of skilled labour in
the production process at the workplace. Of greater significance, family-
dominated, often single stage small to medium size, British firms restricted
the scope for the development of managerial and supervisory hierarchies,
internal labour markets and associated training and development initiatives.
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Each of these related mechanisms was a central feature of American mass-
production systems. Many British firms were small, by comparison to
model fordist firms in the United States. The majority of British
manufacturing plants (70 per cent) employed fewer than 500 workers with
only 60 employing more than 5,000. Hence, the majority of British firms
were too small to scale-up, standardise output and produce for a mass
market. Employers clung to embedded systems of production because they
met the needs of established and in some cases closed (to American
competition) markets that exhibited considerable diversity in customer
requirements.23 The historically embedded pre-fordist production systems
that British firms exhibited represent a self-imposed if necessary restriction
on the rationalisation of production in many sectors of the manufacturing
sector.24
The reluctance of employers to act as modernisers reflected the short-
term security that established markets created. Stability in markets sustained
continuity in production methods – which in turn consolidated the existing
framework for job regulation in collective bargaining.25 Employer
representatives and TUC representatives presented separate approaches to
collective bargaining which although they contained some common ground,
for example the continued reliance on national agreements, multi-unionism
and restrictive practices, failed to prevent significant levels of industrial
conflict between capital and labour during the 1950s. For many employers
collective bargaining represented a mechanism that aimed to re-establish
autocratic control in the workplace.26 In this context ‘free collective
bargaining’ meant free from institutionalised regulation in the workplace –
the latter representing a key feature of fordist regulation.
The consolidation of existing patterns of regulation in industrial
relations was, however, positioned within a fully employed economy. The
imperative of output shifted the focus of collective bargaining to the
workplace where shop stewards emerged as central actors in localised
collective bargaining. The evidence suggests that bargaining was primitive
or informal. Further, the evidence demonstrates that employers who were
primarily concerned with output, such as those in the car industry and
engineering, accepted local pay deals that supplemented national
agreements as a matter of course.27 Many employers failed to secure any
quantifiable increases in productivity but appeared unconcerned, as they
were able to pass increased costs onto consumers.28
The evidence indicates that between 1948 and 1958 wage drift (earnings
minus the wage rate component) remained fairly constant at 25 shillings
(£1.25) whereas over the same period output increased 2.3 per cent, with
unit labour costs growing at 4 per cent per annum. These data indicate that
allocative inefficiency in the manufacturing sector – a reliance on overtime
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rather than capital investment to standardise and raise the scale of
operations – did not increase during this period. However, as the UK’s
comparative economic efficiency declined workplace ‘inefficiencies’
previously accepted as marginal became more significant, focussing on
labour but ignoring the comparative investment deficiencies of capital.29
Historically Embedded National Pathways
National pathways to industrial capitalism reflect institutional and economic
processes that become embedded in the state, economy and civil society to
create a ‘national business system’.30 The process of particularisation within
the state, economy and civil society creates a pattern of institutional
embeddedness in management practice and industrial relations that
facilitates or inhibits the adoption of new production paradigms such as
fordism in the UK during the post-war period. Djelic demonstrates how the
French and West German economies integrated aspects of fordist work
organisation, whilst retaining integrity in their respective national pathways.
As Clark demonstrates, in the British case during the early post-war years,
the situation was very different: manufacturers exhibited a near total
rejection of fordist production systems.31 Whilst apparently subject to the
international, if not hegemonic, logic of multilateralism and fordism in the
Bretton Woods monetary arrangements and the Marshall plan, the state and
capital secured an insular domestic stability that reflected the UK’s pre-
fordist diverse craft traditions.32
Over the long term the reluctant and slow adoption of aspects of
American mass-production systems resulted in unforeseen consequences, for
example, a widening of the UK’s manufacturing productivity lag with the
United States.33 Organised labour, particularly the effects of workplace
restrictive practices, receives particular blame for the failure of an early move
to mass-production. However, the part played by employers is unclear or
misrepresented, whereas there is a tendency to examine workplace restrictive
practices in isolation from the wider context of production systems.
The evidence suggests that those representatives of employer groups and
workplace managers in post-war drives to improve management and
production systems and productivity saw ‘Americanisation’ as a threat to
established British production and management systems and markets. For
example, executive members of the AACP’s British section demanded that
there be ‘no American inquisition’ and that the British section put their
proposals to the Americans in the context of narrowly defined British
interests and markets.34 Zeitlin demonstrates quite clearly the presence of
this fear in the engineering sector, a sector where craft systems if not
methods were deeply embedded.35 More significantly than this, the British
section framed and secured a strategy that maintained manufacturing output
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within existing systems of production. This strategy, which continued in
some sectors into the 1960s, aimed successfully in the short term to prevent
a loss of market share domestically and overseas.36
While analysis of the aims and objectives of British manufacturers is
often underdeveloped, material produced by Zweig suggests that the
continued use of craft methods of production legitimised and structured
continuity in workplace industrial relations. Zweig presents a detailed study
of workplace regulation in collective bargaining through the vehicle of
restrictive practices.37 The material examines the situation in construction
and civil engineering, cotton, iron and steel, printing and engineering. The
findings from the study are very revealing. First, there was little agreement
on the management side, in and between sectors, on what constituted a
restrictive practice. Second, a majority of employers did not view
demarcation rules within multi-unionism as restrictive because they flowed
from apprentice regulations that were necessary to secure skilled labour.
Third, only in the print industry did workplace practices restrict output.
Overall, the study concludes that the presence of workplace restrictive
practices was an integral component of management practice. Across the
five sectors, Zweig demonstrates that many managers viewed restrictive
practices as part of a ‘negotiated’ order  that helped to sustain output, rather
than unilateral and preventative craft control over the labour process. A
study of engineering during the 1960s found that management in the sample
saw similar economic and industrial relations advantages in closed shops.38
By the late 1970s a survey of manufacturing found that 35 per cent of
management saw the closed shop as beneficial to production whereas only
14 per cent saw it as problematic.39
The capitalist production process developed in the UK during the
nineteenth century and was as much about co-operation and compromise as
coercion and conflict.40 Management practices and plural regulation of
labour remained embedded until the late 1970s and helped secure profits
and output well into the post-war period. The necessity and acceptability of
restrictive practices remain as one manifestation of this process. Zweig’s
contemporary empirical evidence suggests that maintaining output was the
primary management concern whereas labour reform in the production
process was of lesser significance. Zweig’s study is frequently cited in
orthodox studies but it is often misrepresented as supporting the view that
trade unions and restrictive practices represent the main reason for the
failure to move to fordist production systems in the post-war period.41
However, the misrepresentation has led to a sustained debate in the
literature.42 First, as Clark argues, Zweig is in effect a primary source and
not a contributor to the contemporary debate on economic performance and
comparative economic decline.43 Second, as Tomlinson and Tiratsoo
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demonstrate critics of pluralism in industrial relations and its effects on
British economic performance exaggerate the presence and scale of
restrictive practices in British manufacturing industry.44 Moreover, the
evidence and arguments provided by Zweig, Clark and Tomlinson and
Tiratsoo demonstrate quite clearly that, whatever the scale and scope of
restrictive practices, they failed to restrict the stated aim of post-war
recovery – an output boom designed to secure food imports, the sterling
area and domestic manufacturing industry. In summary the presence and
effects of restrictive practices are the subject of intense debate, yet as this
article argues, they had little or no effect on employer decisions to eschew
model fordism. The basis of these decisions lay beyond the industrial
relations system. 
The size of the American domestic market, its egalitarian income
distribution, labour shortages and large numbers of immigrant consumers
facilitated mass production and capital substitution in the production
process.45 These conditions were largely absent in the UK during the post-
war period. Rather, the UK’s labour shortage made the use of existing
systems more imperative in the context of a post-war recovery drive that
centred on securing output and the UK’s wider world role. 
The rise of ‘managerial capitalism’ presents systems of work
organisation and production that remove work organisation from the shop
floor and apply interchangeable machinery to de-skill labour.46 Tolliday
demonstrates how, in combination, the absence of these factors frustrated
and defeated attempts by Ford to transplant American production and labour
strategies into the UK as early as the 1920s.47 More generally, in the post-war
period, the absence of these factors resulted from more deeply embedded
pre-fordist production systems that representatives of British employers
fought so hard to maintain. Hence, the rejection of Americanisation was
necessary, if consequential, yet the significance of trade union resistance to
the process of rejection appears as a marginal factor.48
Employer Resistance, Markets and Economic Performance 
Employer resistance appears to reflect short-term instrumentalism, which in
turn reflects the embedded nature of production systems and established
British markets. The pervasive effects of employer preferences appear
disengaged from more prevalent discussion of employee resistance to
fordist work systems. 
Employer Instrumentalism
Several recently published studies of British post-war economic
performance present four significant factors that explain the UK’s relative
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and comparative decline; the production and labour process are important to
each factor.49 First, manufacturers exhibited a structural attachment to
relatively secure, if differentiated, slow growth export markets, many of
them in former Empire countries or the sterling area.50 Second, an
unwillingness to move to Americanised mass production methods.51 Third,
and related, there was a failure to establish direct control over the
production process in the workplace.52 Finally, decentralised and
disintegrated management and supervisory hierarchies prevailed in many
family owned firms.53 The ease with which representatives of British capital
deflected and diluted state-sponsored and American-inspired mechanisms
for the ‘Americanisation’ of management and production, demonstrates the
relative autonomy of the state from British capital.54 A contradictory feature
of relative autonomy appears in the observation that British employers are
instinctively short-term in outlook. The attitude of British employers to
management, work organisation and industrial relations in the immediate
post-war period reflected a series of instinctive strategic choices, related
directly to product markets, formulated as early as 1943. At this time the
state bodies such as the Board of Trade and representatives of capital such
as the Federation of British Industries (FBI) indicated that the UK’s
projected post-war financial position would dictate that output and exports
must prevail over industrial modernisation, on what became termed the
‘American model’. For example, the Board of Trade were critical of ‘bad
management’ but assumed that the UK’s manufacturing base would
continue to serve non-standard domestic and export markets, particularly
those in the sterling area.55 The FBI established that British firms would
need a measure of protection from American-dominated open competition
– multilateralism – through maintenance of the sterling area and Imperial
preference in empire and Middle Eastern markets,56 a preference that the
FBI secured in the aims of the British section of the AACP between 1948
and 1952.57
The short-termist outlook sustained by British manufacturers also
reflected the laissez-faire development of the British state and
capital–labour relations therein. Action within mechanisms such as the
AACP and later, the British Productivity Council (BPC) represented an
instrumental strategic choice imbued with short-termism. In addition, they
are an allegory for a historically embedded pattern of relations between the
state, capital and labour. For example, as Zeitlin demonstrates, the Board of
Trade and the Ministry of Supply’s Lemon Committee on industrial
standardisation in engineering concluded that compulsory industrial
standardisation was impracticable and likely to lead to bureaucratic rigidity
and inefficiency.58 An alternative view of this might suggest a laissez-faire
relationship between the state and capital that de-centralised the issue of re-
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structuring to institutions such as the AACP, which became employer
dominated. The short-term priorities of profitability, secure markets and
greatest output at low investment cost prejudiced the position of the British
Employers Federation (BEF) and the FBI in best-practice institutions such
as the AACP and BPC. Tomlinson and Tiratsoo demonstrate that
representatives of British employers and management saw the AACP as a
potential mechanism for significant state intervention – a view which
reinforced their dilettante engagement with Americanisation.59 American
dominated AACP reports prescribe systems of standard costing for
components, the introduction of work-study methods and associated
production planning, palletisation and job evaluation schemes to structure,
standardise and simplify production and the labour process in
manufacturing.60 The British section railed against these measures, citing
diverse export markets and flexibility of end use requirements as mitigating
factors against the adoption of such practices.61 The persistent defence of de-
centralised, non-standard systems of management in pre-fordist production
systems structured a reliance on the craft labour hierarchy on the shop floor.
In contrast to this, the preference for pre-fordist systems of management,
production and work organisation was the result of instrumental strategic
choices made by capital that served and reflected other (world) interests in
the state. 
To contextualise the resistance of British employers against a movement
to Americanised mass-production techniques and associated systems of
work organisation, the significance of British export markets requires
further examination. Whilst the evidence demonstrates that British export
markets for manufactured goods were in large measure non-standard there
is a debate on the nature, origins and degree of product differentiation,
particularly the respective roles of producers and customers in the
maintenance of non-standard products.62 A significant and related, if often
less reported issue is the scale of these export markets. Non-standard export
markets to Empire nations and the sterling area represented 45 per cent of
UK exports in 1938. This figure rose to nearly 50 per cent by 1950 and
remained at that level until 1958.63 In many areas of manufacturing, the
domestic market was equally non-standard and highly differentiated.
For example, the evidence demonstrates that, throughout the post-war
period, in comparison to Ford the British Motor Corporation produced far
fewer standardised cars. But more significantly the degree of
standardisation at Ford was nowhere near as extensive as ‘fordism’ might
suggest.64 Equally, Jones argues that the non-standard eclecticism of British
manufacturers endures in the contemporary period. Jones concludes that
this limits convergence towards a high technology post-fordism between the
UK, Japan and the United States in many areas of manufacturing.65 It seems
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implausible to suggest that British firms were able to replace embedded
non-standard markets – the implication of a movement to mass-production
techniques modeled on penetration of the American and emergent western
European market, hence the retention of non-standard production in many
areas of manufacturing. A low-investment industrial recovery from war was
essential to secure the viability of sterling and domestic economic aims,
such as full employment and the creation of the NHS. The significance of
conservatism and short-termism in the wider institutional structure of the
economy impacts directly on institutional attitudes and responses to the
reform and modernisation of the labour and production process in industry. 
The Marshall plan and American sponsored institutions such as the
AACP, BPC and the technical assistance programme made formidable
attempts to change British employer attitudes to methods and practices in
work organisation, work study and product simplification and
standardisation. Whilst the aim of each institution was the promotion of
apparently neutral best practice, employer perceptions of state intervention
combined with alien (=American) transmission mechanisms doomed to
failure each attempt to change. For example, the human relations dimension
to the administration of labour management – what Americans termed
personnel – together with attempts to disseminate a management education
programme based on the Harvard MBA appeared laughable to many British
employers and management representatives. Equally, the lack of progress
made by American multinationals in transplanting domestic systems into
the UK further weakened the various transmission mechanisms of fordism.
Dunning, reporting on 30 firms, either wholly or partially acquired by US
multinationals between 1927 and 1952 found the impact of American
practices on labour management and work organisation either negligible or
partial in the majority of cases. Americanisation was evident in production
planning (measured day work), budget control and marketing. Changes to
factory layout, simplification, standardisation and even palletisation were
all absent. Americanisation in operations management, industrial relations
and work organisation appeared in only nine cases.66 Alhstrand argues that
the Americanisation of management techniques at the Fawley Oil refinery,
leading to more direct management control of labour, famously reported by
Flanders, appeared unsustainable beyond the short term. Measures to cut
overtime and workplace informality by the introduction of measured day
work and flexibility agreements soon evaporated. Ahlstrand argues that
management appeared incapable of extracting sufficient employee
commitment to sustain a high productivity regime. Further, the attitude of
management to work rules that aimed to reduce the impact of restrictive
practices merely heightened worker awareness of demarcation.67 Equally,
the evidence suggests that British firms that exported to the American
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market were no more inclined to fordism than those which exported to the
sterling area. For example, Thoms and Donnelly demonstrate that the
failure of the UK sports car industry to penetrate the American market was
attributable to comparative inefficiencies in production systems, not labour
intransigence. Equally, in sectors where the UK’s craft tradition exhibited a
comparative advantage – for example, aero engines and shipbuilding – the
tradition did not inhibit British success in the American market.68
Resistance to an Americanisation of the labour process was economic,
institutional and structural in origin but also became personalised during the
course of the technical assistance programme. Participants on AACP and
other study trips to the US recorded highly derogatory remarks about
American managers and American management systems. The apparent
hegemony of the American model began to focus earlier and more abstract
assertions about the economic and political intentions of the United States –
multilateralism in an integrated federal pan-European market.69
The Failure of Fordism and Economic Performance?
The dilettante and sluggish movement of British manufacturing industry
towards a systematic use of fordist methods of work organisation is
attributable, in much of the literature, to the effects of restrictive labour
practices at the workplace. The management bias in much of this work
underestimates or ignores the embedded aims and interests of British
management and employers. Alternatively, the superior economic
performance associated with the success of the American business system
was something that British firms aimed to achieve. They were unable to
achieve this, however, due to the intransigence of trade unions, particularly
multi-unionism and the vagaries of the industrial relations system.70
The evidence indicates that British firms failed to systematically adopt
fordist methods of work organisation in the post-war period, yet the restrictive
effects of the industrial relations system appear distinctively marginal to the
main strategic decisions in causing this. Transmission mechanisms aimed to
promote, prescribe and structure fordist work organisation and the benefits of
the American business system more generally. The Marshall plan, the AACP,
the TAP and the move to multilateralism in the late 1950s all prescribed
mechanisms that appeared to undermine the legitimacy of institutional and
economic factors embedded within the British business system. Chandler
demonstrates that these factors – family dominated firms, horizontal and
vertical disintegration, non-standard and relatively small markets – are of
greater significance than restrictive labour practices.71 Those approaches that
stereotype the labour and production process appear less able to recognise the
limited impact of trade union resistance to fordist work organisation, or the
need for employer resistance. 
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The generalisation of fordist elements within the American business
system and international trade and foreign direct investment under managed
multilateralism after 1958 appeared to render the British national business
system obsolete. However, what made aspects of the British business
system more imperative at this time was the threat of fordist work
organisation and the American multilateral business system. A wider
framework of contemporary history is capable of examining the labour and
production process and the failure of fordism in relation to more significant
institutional pressures that dispersed and diluted transmission mechanisms
for fordist work organisation in the UK. Many contemporary accounts of
the UK’s flawed transition to post-fordism ignore the significance of the
historical approach. They remain wedded to the restrictive practice thesis
and the role of trade unions in the decline of shop-floor skills in the UK, a
decline that allegedly restricted the capability of British manufacturers to
take advantage of modern flexible production technologies in the period
since 1979. 
Flawed Fordism to a Flourishing Post-Fordism in the Contemporary
Period?
The debate about British economic performance since 1945 was recently re-
ignited by the publication of research which claims that the rejection of the
post-war settlement in 1979, its associated production paradigm and related
labour process coincided with technological trends in Britain’s favour.72
Given that the cost of information processing has fallen significantly in real
and transactional terms, technological leadership now demands customised
output in high technology workplaces that employ skilled craft-type
labour.73 This section examines the contemporary plausibility of this claim
by drawing on the empirical yet historically embedded arguments
developed in the first two sections.
For Broadberry the political rejection of the post-war system swept aside
many rigidities and sources of only sluggish change by British management
previously highlighted by Hirst and Zeitlin and Kilpatrick and Lawson.74
The former suggest that vested interests between capital, labour and the
state prevented an early and effective movement to post-fordism in the UK,
where trade unions acted as a drag on management initiative and proposals
for change. In contrast to this Kilpatrick and Lawson highlight the negative
effects of Britain’s industrial relations system and associated craft labour
process wherein trade union resistance and the effects of Empire on
management interests blocked an effective movement to fordist work
organisation. Broadberry argues that the removal of drag effects on British
employers both within and beyond the industrial relations system created
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the conditions for an effective and swift transition to post-fordism.
Post-Fordism in Britain? 
Material in the first two sections illustrates the conceptual significance of
fordist work organisation in debates on Britain’s post-war economic
recovery and decline. The primary research material demonstrates that in
relation to the British manufacturing sector the concepts of fordism and
fordist work organisation appear analytically and empirically flawed.75 The
labels ‘fordist’ and ‘post-fordist’ generalise and divide the period since
1945 into two broad headings: mass produced standardised commodities,
institutionalised collective bargaining and full employment welfare state
capitalism constitute the central features of fordism.76 By contrast, in the
contemporary period since 1979, the demise of mass standardised markets
appears in the emergence of niche markets dominated by branding, and the
erosion or hollowing out of corporatism and social democracy in the state.77
A particular feature of this transition in the UK was government rejection of
collective bargaining and institutionalised personnel management as pay-
effort regulator and procedural administrators of the labour and production
process in post-war systems of work organisation – Britain’s flawed
fordism. 
Post-fordism has three conceptual and prescriptive, if empirically
contested features: the renaissance of multi-skilled craft workers, the
deployment of de-centralised production systems with extensive worker
autonomy and discretion, and extensive production specialisation.78 Since
the election of Thatcher in 1979, successive governments have promoted
the rhetoric of these features as central in a movement towards a libertarian
and populist enterprise approach to economic restructuring – termed by the
present government ‘the Knowledge Driven Economy’.79 Supporters of this
movement claim that, whilst the performance of the British economy since
1945 has disappointed, poor performance in manufacturing was confined to
the period prior to 1979.80 For Broadberry and Crafts, the commitment of
governments to market forces since 1979 and the reform of industrial
relations have reversed the process of comparative economic decline.81
The research base detailed by Broadberry examines the performance of
British manufacturing since 1850 using a framework of technological
evolution over three periods: 1850–1914, 1914–50 and 1950–90. The
research bases establish long-term productivity trends in the American,
British and German economies and highlight the parallel development of
mass production systems in the United States and flexible production
systems in Germany and the UK. To establish the superior efficiency of
American mass production and associated processes for direct control of
labour, standardisation and customisation appear to be key analytical
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factors. Assessment of the failure by British industry to move towards the
model of fordist work organisation range across factors such as technology,
investment in human and physical capital, markets and levels of
competition.82 The research base and framework produce detailed industry-
wide comparative productivity measurements combined with a qualitative,
if brief industrial and business history. 
The significance of Broadberry’s approach is not its authority or
credibility, but the manner in which it encapsulates the ahistorical
managerial bias in much of the literature on contemporary British
economic performance. Industrial relations and the related labour process
issues are relegated to perfunctory comment in the opening and concluding
chapters, neither of which contain any reference to empirical material or
debates on the contribution of management in the flawed nature of fordist
work organisation in the UK. As Evans et al. demonstrate, while the
industrial relations system has some effect on economic performance and
the take-up or otherwise of prescriptive templates for work organisation, its
effects are often overexaggerated.83 For example the broad thrust of
Broadberry’s work confirms the argument of Evans et al. that in the post-
war period Britain’s comparative economic performance appears poor,
particularly during the 1980s. More significantly than this, Evans et al.
point to the, at best marginal and at worst insignificant, effects of
legislative intervention in the industrial relations system on the UK’s
comparative economic performance. As subsequent contributions to the
debate demonstrate, this intervention had one significant and one lasting
effect.84 First, by improving the managerial prerogative and cheapening
labour it extended the life of comparatively obsolete capital in many areas
of manufacturing. Second, in the context of a severe recession and
associated increases in unemployment, the measures had little effect on
industrial output that remained static for most of the 1980s. Labour
productivity improved as fewer workers produced less output. A further
authoritative study of contemporary economic restructuring takes a similar
less-quantitative and less-stereotyped approach, by focusing on up-skilling
and training and development to draw rather different conclusions to those
of Broadberry.85
Gallie et al. demonstrate that some aspects of each feature within the
post-fordist paradigm prevail in the UK, but they fall a long way short of an
effective transition in the manufacturing sector and beyond. For example,
skilled labour is the prime beneficiary of training and development and up-
skilling designed to promote specialised production, based on task
autonomy and multi-skilling. In contrast to this positive scenario for multi-
skilling, less skilled members of the labour force often experience a far
more negative scenario associated with unemployment or de-skilling and
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task intensification more evident in fordist production systems.86 As Gallie
et al. demonstrate, management strategies of a fordist type or pre-fordist
type based on command and control appear to minimise or deny the need
for an improved skill base. The empirical evidence suggests that
employers position the rhetoric of up-skilling in work systems that do the
reverse of this.87 For example, as late the 1980s the British engineering
sector continued to demonstrate non-standard specifications for
components, materials and products, but the lack of standardisation
eschews the central elements of post-fordism. A European wide study of
mechanical engineering found that whilst labour costs are the main
element in value added production in this sector, engineering is
susceptible to high wages across the EU.88 This susceptibility reflects the
necessity of highly qualified human capital and associated packages for
training and development. For the British sector the study concluded that
whilst labour costs appear comparatively low, firms are unable to take
advantage of this, because a comparative lack of training and development
inhibits skill formation and the widespread introduction of post-fordist
work systems. In summary, the costs of tooling and up-skilling restrict the
comparative wage cost competitiveness of British mechanical engineering
as a low cost sector.
The restrictive access to skill-raising training and development and
therefore access to more flexible high technology post-fordist work systems
restricts the diffusion of such systems across the British manufacturing
sector.89 The findings of the Ifo Institut and those of the OECD illustrate
how lower-skill employees in the UK appear extremely flexible but beyond
the structure of post-fordist work systems. Alternatively, it is the manner by
which employers recruit, deploy and terminate labour that appear as the
main features of flexibility. Cully et al. demonstrate that headcount or
numerical flexibility in the British labour market restricts functional
flexibility to fewer than 50 per cent of all workplaces.90
Discussion of the marginal movement to post-fordist work systems in
the contemporary period demonstrates the relevance of the historical
analysis. By moving beyond ahistorical generalisation in the discussion of
Britain’s economic performance and its relationship to production systems
and industrial relations, the material reinforces the plausibility of
historically embedded national pathways exhibiting highly distinctive
production processes. In a broader historical perspective, contemporary
restructuring towards a post-fordist model reprises earlier attempts to
restructure British manufacturing towards fordist work systems in the
1960s. As Marginson notes, in the 1960s attempts to introduce M-form
management structures and associated reforms of the industrial relations
framework, such as productivity bargaining and measured day work,
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exhibited a desire for greater managerial control over labour at plant level.91
Such efforts had a superficial effect upon work organisation. The aim of
these changes was to promote a mode of regulation associated with fordist
work systems previously aired in the immediate post-war period when by
the 1960s evidence on the presence of these systems was marginal.92 Since
1979 reform, if not eradication of Britain’s (historically embedded)
industrial relations system, and a (rhetorical) movement to alternative
methods of job regulation, centred on non-unionism and Human Resource
Management, further demonstrating the superficial nature of economic
restructuring.93
The Historical Myth of Mass Production in the Post-War Period94
For the immediate post-war years the empirical evidence suggests
considerable employer resistance to restructuring in the British
manufacturing sector along the lines of fordist work organisation. The
system of mass production appears as a contested production template that
was far less empirically dominant than generalised academic frameworks
imply. The reasons for the contested nature of the template are more
significant than resistance strategies of workers at the point of production. 
In the context of Britain’s precarious post-war financial situation, the
evidence suggests that rejection of economic restructuring in the
manufacturing sector on the model of fordist work organisation was a
correct, if consequential strategy. The declinist literature on the British
economy suggests that by the 1960s, the UK’s comparative economic
decline centred on comparatively low investment levels, small-scale
operations and the dis-economies of embedded managerial techniques.95
Conversely, attempts to re-structure British manufacturing during the 1960s
focused on promoting the efficiency gains of components in the fordist
model such as M-form structures and more direct plant level regulation of
labour. Neither of these developments necessarily created significant
changes in methods of production management and work organisation.
Further, seeking to improve managerial control of labour is different from
attempts to restructure the wider production and labour process or reform its
contested nature. 
As early as 1952, the AACP concluded that comparative managerial
inefficiency in costing, layout, standardisation, work study and productivity
management each represented demonstrative and serious impediments to
the UK’s long term post-war recovery.96 The imperative of financial
recovery and the extent of non-standard home and export markets dictated
a low investment strategy to post-war economic recovery. The absence of
sterling convertibility shielded the British economy from international
competition on a multilateral model until the late 1950s. In combination,
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these historically embedded financial, competitive and structural factors
restricted the application of the fordist model of production organisation and
associated labour process in the British economy. This pattern was
subsequently repeated during the prescriptive movement to a post-fordist
production template and associated labour process during the contemporary
period. 
Management in many sectors of British manufacturing, and now
services, appears wedded to a comparatively low investment strategy whilst
for practitioners and academics production templates appear to change over
time.97 The approach of British management exhibits increasingly poor
technique – a highly particularised style of management that reflects a series
of historically embedded competitive, financial and structural factors.98
Conclusions 
It appears likely that the strategic choices made by capital and the state
during the immediate post-war years was instrumental and restricted.
Principally British employers and management contested the American
model of fordist work organisation with active but tacit support from the
British state. Later attempts to lever aspects of the fordist template for work
organisation and production into the British workplace was contested by
labour, yet the more significant sources of resistance lay beyond labour. The
American model of work organisation for mass standardised production and
management as a science is described within academic frameworks as
competitive capitalism. The evidence suggests that the framework did not,
and could not, reflect the reality of the British economy during the post-war
period. In contrast to this, perceptions of American economic efficiency,
related models of work organisation and associated design for the direct
control of labour have influenced practitioners and academics in their
explanations of Britain’s economic post-war economic performance and
decline.
Equally, during the 1980s and early 1990s the renaissance of the British
manufacturing sector and a more general movement to post-fordism were
both premised on a rejection of the UK’s post-war social and economic
model, be it fordist or otherwise.99 The Thatcher government, supported by
influential academic commentators, summarised the renaissance of British
manufacturing in the term ‘the productivity miracle’.100 However, by the late
1990s the productivity miracle had turned to a productivity gap of between
20 and 40 per cent measured against the UK’s major industrial
competitors.101 Commentators who, during the height of the ‘productivity
miracle’ and ‘movement to post-fordism’, were more sceptical, were proved
correct in their assertions. For example, Nolan demonstrated that whilst
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labour productivity improved it was of a windfall nature and had little effect
on the UK’s comparatively high unit labour costs and comparatively low
labour productivity.102 In contrast Clark demonstrates that the reform of
organised labour in the workplace, particularly in removal of closed shops
and other restrictive practices, is undoubted, yet the positive effects that
were predicted to follow from this are conspicuous in their absence. This is
particularly the case with respect to organisational change and development
incorporating what Gallie et al. illustrate is only a patchy up-take of post-
fordism combined with a skills, training and development gap wider than
that which existed during the post-war period, suggesting the failure of new
management strategies such as human resource management.103 Second,
flexibility has emerged as a labour-use strategy as opposed to flexibility in
integrated production systems associated with post-fordism. Last, the whole
of the ‘productivity miracle’ during the 1980s represents a micro-version of
the whole of the post-war period – that is, good performance relative to the
recent past but comparative economic decline. 
Economic performance during the post-war period could not have been
better than it was bearing in mind the wider objectives of the British State –
military great power, nuclear power, sterling as a reserve currency,
independence from Europe and the United States – which restricted
economic policy to mitigating the adverse trend in Britain’s international
competitiveness. In contrast to this, during the 1980s economic policy
aimed to rid the manufacturing sector of institutional and economic
inefficiency – at the cost not of mitigating comparative economic decline
but accelerating the process quite dramatically.104
The absence of historical specificity in the examination of embedded
national pathways appears to reverse the process of causation in the
evaluation of contested workplace resistance to apparently superior
economic and managerial models. Employer resistance to fordist work
organisation was necessary and instrumental, if consequential in terms of
industrial relations and economic performance. Employer resistance to post-
fordism – particularly investment in new capital equipment, training and
development for staff and what Gallie et al. term the ‘positive scenario’ for
labour – was equally instrumental. The UK’s flexible labour market had the
effect of further cheapening the UK’s comparatively low wage costs to
extend the life span of comparatively obsolete capital stock, a process very
similar to that experienced in the immediate post-war years. 
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